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Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD)
to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address
this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we
present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in
circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD
implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the
system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The
security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its
robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] faces the
challenge of bridging the large gap between theory and
practice. Theoretically, QKD offers perfectly secure com-
munications based on the laws of physics. In practice,
however, it does not because most physical devices do
not operate as it is presumed in the security proofs. As
a result, current QKD implementations suffer from secu-
rity loopholes that allow for side-channel attacks [4–14].
To avoid these loopholes and recover the security
of QKD realisations there are currently two main ap-
proaches where assumptions on the internal functioning
of the measurement devices are avoided. The first one is
called (full) device-independent QKD (diQKD) [15–19].
Here, the legitimate users of the system (Alice and Bob)
treat their apparatuses as two “black boxes”. Given that
certain conditions are satisfied, it is possible to prove
the security of diQKD based solely on the violation of
a Bell inequality. Importantly, this solution can remove
all side-channels from the quantum part of a QKD im-
plementation. Its main drawback, however, is that it re-
quires a loophole-free Bell test [20–25] with distant com-
municating parties, which is yet to be achieved. Also, its
expected secret key rate with current technology is very
low at practical distances [26, 27].
The second approach is called measurement-device-
independent QKD (mdiQKD) [28]. In contrast to
diQKD, Alice and Bob need to know their state prepa-
ration processes but they can treat the measurement de-
vice as a “black box” fully controlled by the eavesdropper
(Eve). This solution eliminates all side-channels from the
measurement unit, which can be regarded as the weakest
part of a QKD implementation [4–10], and guarantees
a very high performance. Indeed, mdiQKD tolerates a
high optical loss of more than 40 dB and it can give a
secret key rate similar to that of standard entanglement-
based QKD protocols [29]. Moreover, its feasibility has
already been proven both in laboratories and via field-
tests [30–35]. This suggests the viability of mdiQKD to
connect theory and practice in QKD. This approach has,
however, two slight drawbacks. First, mdiQKD requires
high-visibility two-photon interference using two different
light sources, which makes its experimental implementa-
tion more demanding than that of conventional QKD sys-
tems. Second, the current finite-key security bounds [36]
require relatively large post-processing data block sizes
to achieve good performance.
Here we propose an alternative solution to remove de-
tector side-channels in QKD realisations. It follows a
similar spirit to that of mdiQKD. That is, Alice and Bob
need to characterise their state preparation processes but
do not have to trust the measurement device, which is
treated as a “black box”. Note, however, that the concept
of “black box” is now different from that of mdiQKD. In
particular, we requiere that Alice and Bob know the op-
tical elements contained in the box, but no knowledge
is required on the way they work or on which quantum
system they operate [39]. This is so to prevent attacks
that exploit the fact that Eve can build the measure-
ment unit herself and she includes additional elements
that leak key information to the channel [37, 38]. Indeed,
our proposal requires that Alice and Bob guarantee that
the measurement system does not leak any unwanted in-
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FIG. 1: (a) Schematic diagram of measurement-device-
independent QKD (mdiQKD) [28]. Alice and Bob prepare
different quantum states and send them to an untrusted relay
Charles, which can be treated as a black box fully controlled
by Eve. Charles is supposed to implement a Bell state mea-
surement (BSM) that projects the incoming signals into a Bell
state. (b) Schematic diagram of our proposal. Alice gener-
ates different quantum states and sends them to Bob. On
receiving the signals, Bob encodes his information by means
of a trusted linear optics network (LON), which can be re-
garded as Bob’s transmitter (when compared to mdiQKD).
This LON does not include any light source but it simply ma-
nipulates the state of the incoming signals. Afterwards, Bob
implements a BSM, which is treated as a black box. In the
figure: (brown box) characterised device; (black box) unchar-
acterised device; and (light turquoise box) secure lab, i.e., the
lab does not leak any unwanted information to the outside.
formation to the outside (just like in diQKD). This could
be achieved, in principle, by placing the measurement
apparatus within Bob’s laboratory, and with a measure-
ment device built by them, albeit not necessarily char-
acterised [37]. This condition can be checked/fulfilled in
most practical scenarios. In this case, the only relevant
information to prove security is the statistics of the input
and output data from the box.
In doing so, as will be explained below, it is possible
to avoid the problem of interfering photons from inde-
pendent sources, which considerably simplifies its exper-
imental implementation when compared to mdiQKD. In
the low-loss regime, the security of our approach is guar-
anteed by the results in [40]. Here we also conjectured its
security in the high-loss regime by analysing a particular
class of attacks. In parallel to this work, further devel-
opments towards more general security proofs of single-
photon two-qubit device-independent QKD [37, 41] have
been carried out, together with other experimental im-
plementations [42–44].
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
The key idea of our protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1. For
comparison, this figure also includes a schematic diagram
of mdiQKD [28]. Alice uses a transmitter to prepare dif-
ferent quantum states that she sends to Bob. On the
receiving side, Bob uses a linear optics network (LON)
to manipulate the state of the incoming signals. Alice’s
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FIG. 2: Schematic diagram of an example of a possible imple-
mentation of our method. Alice generates phase-randomised
weak coherent pulses (WCPs) in different BB84 polarisation
states [48], and sends them to Bob. In addition, she prepares
decoy-states [45–47] using an intensity modulator (Decoy-
IM). Bob employs a trusted LON to encode his information on
the incoming signals by using their path degree of freedom.
For this, he uses an optical switch that sends the arriving
states through one out of three possible optical paths of the
same length (paths a, b and c in the figure). Two additional
optical switches are used to guarantee that the selected path
is actually connected to the polarising beamsplitter (PBS).
The switches are represented in the figure with the standard
drawing of arrows and white connectors. The phase modu-
lator φ shifts the phase of each pulse by 0 or pi. Bob mea-
sures the outcoming pulses from the LON with a linear-optics
single-photon BSM [50]. A successful BSM result is obtained
when only one detector Di “clicks”. The polarisation rota-
tor R changes the horizontal (vertical) polarisation to a 45◦
(−45◦) linear polarisation. As in Fig. 1: (brown box) charac-
terised device; (black box) uncharacterised device; and (light
turquoise box) secure lab.
transmitter and Bob’s LON are both trusted and charac-
terised. When compared to mdiQKD, this LON can be
regarded as Bob’s trusted transmitter, although it does
not include any light source. Afterwards, Bob is sup-
posed to implement a Bell state measurement (BSM),
which is considered to be a black box.
One requirement for the measurement device, as men-
tioned above, is that no unwanted information leaks from
the BSM. In practice, a simple way to achieve this is to
place the measurement device within Bob’s shielded lab,
and that Bob builds the BSM himself, such that he can
assure that it does not contain any eavesdropping de-
vice prepared by Eve [37]. This is indeed the expected
situation in most realistic scenarios. Even though Bob
builds the BSM, he does not need to characterise the ex-
act functioning of the optical elements within the BSM
(e.g., polarisation rotators, beamsplitters, single-photon
detectors, etc). That is, in the security analysis one can
treat the whole BSM as a black box, where the only rel-
evant information is the input and output data of the
box.
Let us describe our quantum key distribution proto-
col by using a particular example of a possible imple-
mentation. This setup is schematically shown in Fig. 2.
The protocol can be summarised with the following three
steps:
3Step 1: Alice sends Bob phase-randomised weak coher-
ent pulses (WCPs), together with decoy signals [45–47],
prepared in different BB84 polarisation states [48]. For
each signal, these states are selected independently and
at random from two mutually-unbiased bases, e.g., either
a rectilinear (H [horizontal] or V [vertical]) or a diagonal
(45◦ or −45◦) polarisation basis.
Step 2: On receiving the transmission, Bob employs a
LON to encode his information on the incoming pulses
using their path degree of freedom. For this, he utilises
an optical switch that distributes the arriving signals into
one out of three possible optical paths (a, b and c in
Fig. 2), which he selects independently and at random
for each pulse. In analogy to Alice, we shall denote the
paths a and c in Fig. 2 as Bob’s rectilinear bases, and
the path b (with φ = 0 or φ = pi) as Bob’s diagonal
bases. Moreover, we will consider that Bob’s bit value
associated to selecting the path a (c) is equal to that
of Alice when she chooses H (V ) polarisation, and that
Bob’s bit value associated to selecting the path b with
φ = 0 (φ = pi) is equal to that of Alice when she employs
45◦ (−45◦) polarisation. If we compare this procedure to
that of mdiQKD, one could say that to select path a (c)
in our proposal is somehow equivalent to Bob preparing
a H (V ) polarisation signal in mdiQKD, and similarly
for the diagonal basis. Once Bob has encoded his infor-
mation, the signals are recombined at a polarising beam-
splitter (PBS) and then measured with a linear-optics
single-photon BSM [49, 50]. A successful BSM result
corresponds to observing a “click” in only one detector
Di, with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. If two or more detectors click
simultaneously, the event is considered unsuccessful.
Step 3: Alice and Bob employ an authenticated classi-
cal channel to announce their results. In particular, Bob
declares which pulses produced a successful BSM result
together with the Bell state obtained. Also, Alice and
Bob broadcast the polarisation and path basis that they
have used to generate and measure each successful signal
respectively. They keep the data associated with those
successful events where they used the same basis and
discard the rest. In addition, they use the decoy-state
method [45–47] to estimate the yield (i.e., the probability
that Bob obtains a successful BSM result) and the quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER) for various n-photon states.
Like in mdiQKD, the key point is that with this infor-
mation Alice and Bob can determine whether or not the
BSM is working well enough to be able to distill a se-
cret key. If this is the case, either Alice or Bob applies
a bit flip to part of her/his data to assure that their bit
strings are correctly correlated (see Table I). They then
finally perform error-correction and privacy amplification
procedures to obtain a final secret key.
Let us emphasise that the method described above
could be applied as well to other QKD protocols like, for
instance, the three-state scheme [51, 52]. Also, it could
be adapted to other encoding strategies (e.g., phase en-
coding or time-bin encoding). In addition, let us point
out that the use of optical switches (within Bob’s LON)
“Clicking” detector
Alice & Bob D1 D2 D3 D4
Rectilinear basis - - Bit flip Bit flip
Diagonal basis - Bit flip - Bit flip
TABLE I: To guarantee that their bit strings are correctly cor-
related, either Alice or Bob applies a bit flip to part of her/his
data, depending on which detector Di “clicked” (which identi-
fies the Bell state obtained by the BSM) and the basis setting
selected. Detections at D1, D2, D3 and D4 correspond to the
Bell state projections |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉, where the
Bell states are written in terms of the hybrid polarization-
path encoding [49, 50].
is not essential; indeed, it is possible to design alternative
receivers without these elements.
III. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS
Before we analyse the security of the protocol, let us
begin by stating the security assumptions. In particular,
we assume that Alice and Bob have access to (i) true
random number generators, (ii) trusted classical post-
processing techniques and (iii), an authenticated classi-
cal channel, (iv) Alice’s source and Bob’s LON are fully
characterised and cannot be influenced by Eve, and (v)
Alice’s and Bob’s labs do not leak any unwanted infor-
mation to the outside.
The first three assumptions are also required in con-
ventional QKD systems. The fourth one needs special
attention. In principle, it is reasonable to expect that
Alice can verify the states she sends to Bob in a fully
protected environment outside Eve’s control. For this,
she could protect herself with different optical elements
like, for instance, optical isolators, optical filters and a
monitoring detector; also, she could use random sam-
pling techniques. This is precisely the scenario we face
in mdiQKD. The case of Bob, however, is more delicate.
This is so because he actually receives signals from the
quantum channel. Eve may try to perform, for exam-
ple, a so-called Trojan horse attack [53, 54]. That is, she
could launch bright light pulses into Bob’s LON and then
analyse the back-reflected light. In doing so, Eve could
try to determine Bob’s bit value (i.e., the position of his
optical switch in the example above) for each arriving sig-
nal. In practice, however, this type of attacks (or similar
ones) might be avoided as well by including additional
components on Bob’s side, just like in the case of Alice.
For example, Bob could insert several optical circulators
to attenuate the back-reflected light together with opti-
cal filters to remove undesired modes and a monitoring
detector to test the incoming and/or reflected light. Fur-
ther details on possible countermeasures against Trojan
horse attacks can be found in [53, 54].
Alternatively, Eve could also try to manipulate the cor-
rect operation of Bob’s LON by shifting, for instance,
4the frequency or the arrival time of the incoming pulses.
This way she might influence the functioning of both the
beamsplitter and the phase modulator within the LON.
Again, however, in practice one expects that Bob could
avoid such type of attacks by using, for example, optical
filters together with a time-dependent attenuator. This
attenuator could restrict the arrival time of the signals
to only a certain time window where the devices work
as predicted by the mathematical models used to prove
security. In the example given by Fig. 2 the role of such
attenuator is performed by the optical switch. Further-
more, note that Bob could even remove the phase modu-
lator within his LON. If Alice sends him only three differ-
ent states, it can be shown that this scenario (i.e., with-
out phase modulator on Bob’s side) would be completely
equivalent to that of the three-state protocol [51, 52]. Ac-
cording to the results in [52] the expected performance
in this case would be basically the same as that of the
original situation where Alice and Bob use four different
states.
To conclude this part, let us discuss the fifth assump-
tion considered. Note that this assumption is also re-
quired both in diQKD [38] and mdiQKD. The only differ-
ence is that in mdiQKD this condition does not affect the
measurement unit, which can be located outside Alice’s
and Bob’s secure labs. In our proposal, however, Bob’s
state preparation process is performed by his LON, which
is situated between the channel and the BSM. Therefore,
if we treat the BSM as a “black box” under Eve’s control
and, moreover, this box can send any information that
Eve wishes to the outside, Eve might try to learn the
whole key without introducing any errors, as discussed
in [37]. For this reason, it is essential that Bob can guar-
antee the requirement that the BSM does not leak un-
wanted information to the outside.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now evaluate the security of the protocol. From
the results in [40] we have that our scheme is secure
against general attacks in the low-loss regime (i.e., when
the overall transmittance of the single-photon pulses sent
by Alice is greater or equal to 65.9%) given that Bob’s
measurement device is memoryless. This is so because
the work in [40] contains our proposal as a special case;
more precisely, its security analysis considers the worst-
case scenario where Bob’s device is untrusted. For this
reason, such result, although it guarantees security when
the loss is low, might be over pessimistic since here we
assume that part of Bob’s apparatus (i.e., his LON) can
be actually trusted.
Below we conjecture the security of our scheme also
in the practical and relevant scenario of high losses. For
this, we prove its security against a certain class of at-
tacks. In particular, we assume that Eve can block or
correlate the single-photon pulses sent by Alice with an
ancilla system in her hands, but she cannot add addi-
tional photons to these pulses. That is, whenever Alice
emits a single-photon signal Bob receives either vacuum
or a single-photon. In addition, we permit that Eve can
decide the output of the BSM for each pulse sent by Alice.
A full security proof against general attacks in the high-
loss regime is left for future analysis. Note that recently,
a similar mathematical proof to the one presented here,
with an equivalent level of security, was given in [42].
We use similar arguments to those employed in
mdiQKD [28], which relies on the security of a time re-
versed EPR-based QKD protocol [19, 55, 56]. Indeed, it
can be shown that the protocol illustrated in Fig. 2, when
viewed in the reverse order, is equivalent to a counter-
factual entanglement based BB84 protocol [57]. That is,
whenever Bob observes a single “click” in a detector Di in
our protocol, this corresponds to the situation where Eve
distributes a certain Bell state |φi〉 in the counter-factual
protocol.
To see this, we focus on the single-photon states sent
by Alice. In an equivalent virtual protocol, her sig-
nal state preparation can be thought of as follows. Al-
ice prepares an entangled bipartite state of the form
|Ψ〉AA′ =
∑
i
√
pi|ai〉A|ψi〉A′ . If she measures the vir-
tual system A in the orthonormal basis |ai〉A, she effec-
tively prepares the BB84 states |ψi〉A′ with probability
pi. Moreover, she can also incorporate in her virtual
measurement the information about the reduced density
matrix of system A, i.e., ρA = TrA′(|Ψ〉AA′〈Ψ|), which is
known and fixed by the state preparation process [58, 59].
The case of Bob is more subtle. In a virtual protocol,
he first prepares the virtual state |Φ〉B =
∑
i
√
pi|bi〉B ,
with |bi〉B being an orthonormal basis for system B.
Then, whenever he receives a single-photon signal σA′
from the channel, which might have been manipulated
by Eve, he applies a controlled unitary operation UBA′ =∑
i |bi〉〈bi|B ⊗Ui,A′ on systems B and A′, where the uni-
tary operators Ui,A′ are fixed by his state preparation
process (i.e., by the action of his LON). That is, each
operator Ui,A′ corresponds to one particular setting of
his optical switch and phase modulator. Now, the key
point is that it can be shown (see the Appendix) that af-
ter applying UBA′ the reduced density matrix of system
B, that we denote as ρB , is fixed and equal to ρA inde-
pendently of the incoming single-photon state σA′ . That
is, Bob’s virtual system B is in the same state as if he
would have followed the same state preparation process
as Alice to generate BB84 signals. Now, the scenario is
precisely the same as that of mdiQKD. That is, in the
virtual picture Alice and Bob could in principle keep their
systems A and B in a quantum memory and delay their
measurements on them until the BSM is completed. In
such virtual scenario the protocol is then directly equiv-
alent to an entanglement based BB84 scheme [29, 57].
As a result, we have that the asymptotic secret key
rate formula has the form R ≥ ∑i max{Ri, 0}, with Ri
denoting the key rate associated with those events where
Bob observes a “click” only in detector Di. This param-
5eter is given by [60–62]
Ri ≥ q
{
p0Yi,0 +p1Yi,1[1−h(ei,1)]−Qif(Ei)h(Ei)
}
. (1)
Here, the coefficient q denotes the efficiency of the proto-
col (i.e., q = 1/2 for the standard BB84 protocol [48] and
q ≈ 1 for its efficient version [63]); pn = exp (−µ)µn/n! is
the probability that Alice sends Bob a signal which con-
tains n photons, with µ being the average photon num-
ber of the signals; Yi,n denotes the conditional proba-
bility that Bob only observes a “click” in detector Di
given that Alice sent him an n-photon state; the pa-
rameter ei,n represents the QBER of those n-photon sig-
nals which only produce a click in detector Di; h(x) =
−x log2(x)− (1−x) log2(1−x) denotes the binary Shan-
non entropy function; the term Qi represents the proba-
bility that Bob only obtains a “click” in detector Di when
Alice sends him a signal state, i.e., Qi =
∑
n pnYi,n; the
parameter Ei is the overall QBER associated with a de-
tection in Di, i.e., Ei =
∑
n pnYi,nei,n/Qi; and f(x) is
an inefficiency function for the error correction process
in the protocol (typically f(Ei) ≥ 1; with the Shannon
limit f(Ei) = 1).
Equation (1) contains three parameters which are
not directly observed in the experiment: Yi,0, Yi,1 and
ei,1. To estimate these quantities we use the decoy-state
method [45–47]. Here, for simplicity, we consider that
Alice employs an infinite number of decoy settings and,
therefore, Alice and Bob are able to obtain the precise
values of these parameters. In the practical scenario
where Alice and Bob only use a finite number of decoy
settings one can solve such estimation problem either by
using linear programming tools, or by employing, for in-
stance, the analytical procedure reported in Ref. [64].
As a final remark, let us emphasise, once again, that
in the scenario where Eve can replace the single-photons
with multi-photon or strong pulses, the security of our
scheme is not yet clear. However, one possible solution
might be to ensure that the overall detection efficiency
of all outputs of the measurement device are the same
[37, 65]. This could be verified through the input/output
statistics, and finely tuned by Bob through optical at-
tenuators in each output. Another alternative solution
might be to follow the ideas introduced in [42] and assume
that the linear optical elements within the BSM are also
trusted (i.e., to consider that the only untrusted compo-
nents within Bob are the detectors). Both approaches,
nevertheless, require further investigations.
V. SIMULATION
For simulation purposes we consider inefficient and
noisy threshold detectors Di, and we use experimental
parameters from Ref. [66]. In addition, for simplicity,
we assume that all detectors are identical and their dark
counts are, to a good approximation, independent of the
incoming signals. Moreover, we use a channel model that
FIG. 3: Lower bound on the secret key rate R given by Eq. (1)
in logarithmic scale for the setup illustrated in Fig. 2 with
WCPs (green curve). For simulation purposes, we use exper-
imental parameters from Ref. [66]: the loss coefficient of the
quantum channel is 0.2 dB/km, the intrinsic error rate due
to misalignment and instability of the optical system is 1.5%,
the overall detection efficiency of the detectors Di is 14.5%,
and the background count rate is 6.02 × 10−6. Furthermore,
we consider that the parameter q ≈ 1 [63] and the efficiency
of the error correction protocol satisfies f(Ei) = 1.16. For
comparison, this figure also includes a lower bound on the se-
cret key rate for a standard decoy-state BB84 system with an
infinite number of decoy settings and an active measurement
setup (red curve) [45–47].
includes an intrinsic error rate of 1.5%, simulating the
misalignment and instability of the optical system.
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate R
given by Eq. (1) is illustrated in Fig. 3. For a given to-
tal system loss, i.e., including the losses in the channel
and in Bob’s detection apparatus, we optimise the lower
bound on R over the average photon number µ of Alice’s
signal states, which is around 0.7 for most of the dis-
tances. For comparison, this figure also includes a lower
bound on the secret key rate for an asymptotic decoy-
state BB84 system with an infinite number of decoy set-
tings and an active receiver with two detectors [45–47].
We consider the BB84 scheme with two-detectors as a
comparison because this is a standard configuration for
this protocol, whereas in our new proposal four detec-
tors are required to maximise its key rate. As a result,
we find that both secret key rates are very similar. Only
the cutoff point of the standard decoy-state BB84 scheme
(163 km) is slightly larger than that of the protocol il-
lustrated in Fig. 2 (150 km). This is because in the case
of the standard decoy-state BB84 system Bob’s measure-
ment device has a lower overall dark count rate than that
of our proposal, since it only contains two detectors in-
stead of four. Most importantly, our scheme illustrated in
Fig. 2 delivers a secret key rate which is approximately
two orders of magnitude higher than that of mdiQKD
(please see Fig. 2 in Ref.[28]) for the experimental pa-
rameters considered, although now the covered distance
6is shorter.
VI. PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE EXPERIMENT
For the sake of completeness, we performed a proof-
of-principle experiment to simply demonstrate that all
the required states by the protocol can be successfully
generated and detected. More specifically, a complete
key exchange session with realistic security requirements
(that is, random generation and measurement by Alice
and Bob, decoy states, error correction and privacy am-
plification) is outside the scope of the current work. Also,
for simplicity, instead of using phase-randomised WCPs,
the signal states emitted by Alice are generated with a
continuous wave laser at 690 nm attenuated to the sin-
gle photon level, calibrated to a detection window of 4
ns. Alice controls the polarisation of these signals with a
half-wave plate (HWP), and sends them to Bob through
a free-space channel. Bob’s measurement device is a
slightly modified version of that illustrated in Fig. 2. In
particular, the rectilinear path basis is defined by block-
ing one of the two possible paths of the interferometer,
while the diagonal path basis follows the description of
Fig. 2. This simpler configuration is equivalent to the one
depicted in Fig. 2, but now the rectilinear basis suffers
an additional 3dB loss. Note, however, that one could re-
move this extra loss (introduced by the rectilinear path
basis) if Alice and Bob resort to the diagonal and circular
bases. In this case, Bob would always have the interfer-
ometer with both arms unblocked, and use four different
phase settings, two for each basis.
As a phase modulator, we use a mirror mounted over
a piezoelectric actuator in one of the paths of the inter-
ferometer. No active stabilisation of the interferometer
was needed for the time-scale involved in the experimen-
tal measurements, which were taken with an integration
time of 1s per data point. In order to implement the
BSM we employ two HWPs set to 22.5◦ as rotators R.
The detectors Di are commercial pigtailed single-photon
detectors based on Si avalanche photodiodes, operating
in free-running mode. The overall raw visibility of the
interference curves was 88.4± 0.2%.
We experimentally measured all possible combinations
of states used for the BB84 protocol when both Alice
and Bob simultaneously choose the rectlinear or diago-
nal bases. The single counts are recorded simultaneously
on all four detectors using independent counting circuits
programmed on FPGA-based electronics. The results are
shown in Fig. 4 (see also Table II). They are in good
agreement with the theoretical predictions. From the
measured visibility, the average projected QBER over all
different states is 5.8± 0.1%.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a new approach to the problem
of detector side-channels in practical QKD, which ar-
guably constitutes the Achilles heel of current experi-
mental realisations. It builds on the approach known as
measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD) [28].
However, when compared to mdiQKD, it has two main
potential advantages. First, it is simpler to implement
experimentally since it does not require interference of
independent laser sources, just like conventional QKD
systems. This means, in particular, that no active track-
ing of the arrival times of independent photons nor fre-
quency control of their sources are necessary. Also, it
does not need coincidence detections, which is particu-
larly important for setups with low overall detection effi-
ciency. Second, although in this paper we have assumed
for simplicity the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends
Bob an infinite number of signals, one expects that the
finite secret key rate of our approach will be much higher
than that of mdiQKD as now only Alice needs to send
decoy states. For the same reason, one also expects that
the size of the post-processing data blocks will be signifi-
cantly smaller than those required in mdiQKD, which is
essential in practice [67].
In this work, we already prove the security of our
scheme against general attacks in the low-loss regime
and against a particular class of attacks in the high-loss
regime. Nevertheless, in order for it to be a plausible al-
ternative to mdiQKD, it is crucial to demonstrate its se-
curity against general attacks also in the high-loss regime.
This important open question is left for further studies.
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Appendix
Reduced density matrix ρB. Here we briefly show
that after applying the controlled unitary operation UBA′
7Experimental,probabili/es,
Theore/cal,probabili/es,
FIG. 4: Experimental and theoretical (inset) probabilities to obtain a click in detector Di for all possible combinations of states
when both Alice and Bob use compatible bases. See Table II for further details. The states |a〉 and |c〉 in the figure denote the
paths a and c respectively, while |b, 0〉 and |b, pi〉 represent path b with φ = 0 and φ = pi respectively.
Detection probabilities
State D1 D2 D3 D4
|H〉|c〉 0.3863± 0.0007 0.5823± 0.0010 0.0168± 0.0001 0.0146± 0.0001
|V 〉|c〉 0.5316± 0.0008 0.4652± 0.0007 0.0010± 0.00002 0.0022± 0.00003
|H〉|a〉 0.0152± 0.0001 0.0153± 0.0001 0.5432± 0.0009 0.4263± 0.0007
|V 〉|a〉 0.0010± 0.00002 0.0020± 0.00004 0.5101± 0.0008 0.4862± 0.0008
|45◦〉|b, 0〉 0.3574± 0.0005 0.0488± 0.0001 0.5569± 0.0007 0.0369± 0.0001
|−45◦〉|b, pi〉 0.4357± 0.0005 0.0175± 0.00008 0.5309± 0.0007 0.0158± 0.00007
|45◦〉|b, pi〉 0.0569± 0.0001 0.4871± 0.0006 0.0144± 0.00006 0.4417± 0.00001
|−45◦〉|b, 0〉 0.1591± 0.0002 0.4091± 0.0005 0.0285± 0.000009 0.4033± 0.00005
TABLE II: Detection probabilities for the eight possibilities when Alice and Bob use compatible bases.
the reduced density matrix ρB of Bob’s virtual system is
equal to that of Alice’s virtual system.
For this, we first obtain an expression for the unitary
operators Ui,A′ , with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. As explained in the
main text, here we will assume that system A′ is a qubit.
In particular, when Bob selects path a we have that
U1,A′ |1, 0〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = |1, 0〉inp1 |0, 0〉inp2 ,
U1,A′ |0, 1〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = |0, 1〉inp1 |0, 0〉inp2 , (2)
where the state |1, 0〉 denotes one photon in horizontal
polarisation and |0, 1〉 is one photon in vertical polarisa-
tion. System aux represent the signal in the orthogonal
path (i.e., in path c). The labels inp1 and inp2 denote, re-
spectively, the signals in the two input ports of the BSM.
That is, Eq. (2) tells us that when the single-photon A′
is prepared in horizontal (vertical) polarisation, and Bob
selects path a, then we have one photon in horizontal
(vertical) polarisation in the input port inp1 of the BSM.
When Bob chooses path c we have that
U2,A′ |1, 0〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = |0, 0〉inp1 |1, 0〉inp2 ,
U2,A′ |0, 1〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = |0, 0〉inp1 |0, 1〉inp2 , (3)
where system aux denotes again the signal in the orthog-
onal path (i.e., in path a in this case). That is, when
8the single-photon A′ is prepared in horizontal (vertical)
polarisation, and Bob selects path c, then we have one
photon in horizontal (vertical) polarisation in the input
port inp2.
Using the same procedure we obtain that U3,A′ , which
corresponds to selecting path b and φ = 0, and U4,A′ (for
path b and φ = pi) have the form
U3,A′ |1, 0〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = 1/
√
2
[|1, 0〉inp1 |0, 0〉inp2
+|0, 0〉inp1 |1, 0〉inp2
]
,
U3,A′ |0, 1〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = 1/
√
2
[|0, 1〉inp1 |0, 0〉inp2
+|0, 0〉inp1 |0, 1〉inp2
]
,
U4,A′ |1, 0〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = 1/
√
2
[|1, 0〉inp1 |0, 0〉inp2
−|0, 0〉inp1 |1, 0〉inp2
]
,
U4,A′ |0, 1〉A′ |0, 0〉aux = 1/
√
2
[|0, 1〉inp1 |0, 0〉inp2
−|0, 0〉inp1 |0, 1〉inp2
]
. (4)
System σA′ can always be written as σA′ =
∑
i qi|φi〉A′〈φi| for certain pure states |φi〉A′ . This means,
in particular, that in order to prove that ρB = ρA for any
input state σA′ it is enough to show that this condition
is satisfied for any signal |φi〉A′ = α|1, 0〉A′ + β|0, 1〉A′ .
Let
|φ〉B,inp1,inp2 = UBA′
∑
i
√
pi|bi〉B |φi〉A′ |0, 0〉aux
=
∑
i
√
pi|bi〉BUi,A′ |φi〉A′ |0, 0〉aux. (5)
Then, we have that ρB = Trinp1,inp2(|φ〉B,inp1,inp2〈φ|).
Finally, by combining the equations above now it is
straightforward to show that, independently of the state
|φi〉A′ , indeed ρB is a density matrix of rank two equal to
ρA = TrA′(|Ψ〉AA′〈Ψ|) with |Ψ〉AA′ =
∑
i
√
pi|ai〉A|ψi〉A′
and where |ai〉A in an orthonormal basis and |ψi〉A′ de-
notes de BB84 single-photon states. We omit this step
here for simplicity, but the calculations are direct. Using
the same type of calculations it can also be shown that
ρB is basis independent.
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